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Are R&D subsidies a substitute or a complement to privately funded R&D? 
An econometric analysis at the firm level 
This study examines the effect of research and development subsidies on the private 
funding of R&D in France. We address this issue from the annual R&D survey over 1985-
1997, which provides information about the R&D subsidies given by all the ministries to 
the firms having at least one full-time person working on R&D. In order to determine 
whether the supported firms would have invested the same amount of private R&D 
without the subsidies, we use matching methods. We show that the use of these methods 
is important because the global evaluations, in this paper, more often give a potential 
effect among the non-supported firms than a real effect among the supported firms. We 
first study the probability to get a subsidy. We find that this probability is increasing with 
size, the debt ratio and the importance of privately funded R&D. In a second step, 
controlling for the past public support the firms benefited from, we find that, on average, 
public funds add to private funds, so that there would be no significant crowding out 
effect. 
Keywords: propensity score, non-experimental data, policy evaluation, research and 
development, subsidies. 
JEL Classification: C14, H25, L98, O38. 
 
Les subventions à la recherche et développement sont-elles substituables 
ou complémentaires à leur financement privé  ? Une étude micro-
économétrique. 
Cette étude examine les effets des subventions à la recherche et développement (R&D) 
sur le financement privé de la recherche en France entre 1985 et 1997. Les données 
disponibles portent sur les subventions données par tous les ministères aux entreprises 
employant au moins un chercheur en équivalent temps-plein. Afin de déterminer si les 
entreprises auraient investi les mêmes montants sur fonds privés avec et sans les 
subventions, nous utilisons une méthode d’estimation par appariement. Nous montrons 
que l’emploi de cette méthode est important car les évaluations globales, dans notre 
application, traduisent plus souvent un effet potentiel sur les entreprises non-aidées 
qu’un effet réel sur les entreprises aidées. Dans un premier temps, nous étudions la 
probabilité d’obtenir une subvention. Cette probabilité est croissante avec la taille de 
l’entreprise, son ratio d’endettement et son effort de recherche privée. Dans un second 
temps, et en tenant compte des subventions que l’entreprise a obtenues par le passé, 
nous trouvons qu’en moyenne les financements publics s’ajoutent aux financements 
privés, de sorte qu’il n’y aurait pas d’effet d’éviction significatif. 
Mots-clés : appariement sélectif, données non expérimentales, évaluation de politique 
microéconomique, recherche et développement, subvention. 
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Introduction 
Economists generally agree that innovation is an important source of economic growth. A 
large number of empirical studies at the firm level clearly confirm this view. Originally the 
data available established a connection between research and development investments 
and the productivity differences between the firms, and, more recently the Innovation 
surveys conducted in several countries, have allowed for extending this result to a wider 
set of innovation and performance measures. Therefore, the issue of private incentives to 
research investment is crucial.
3 
In most situations the market will fail to provide sufficient private incentives to innovation 
since innovators face appropriability problems (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). The reason 
is that R&D has some characteristics of a public good, so that the private return on 
innovation will be lower than its social return. Moreover, the cost structure of innovation is 
specific in that it relies on a sunk cost (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). 
Two categories of economic policies have been implemented in order to encourage 
private R&D: the first category aims to increase its private return, the second category 
aims to decrease its private sunk cost. In order to increase the private return on 
innovation, many states have introduced intellectual and industrial property rights in order 
to avoid imitation. However, this patent protection is not always efficient so that a 
combination of policies is needed. For instance, Levin et al. (1987) showed that American 
firms do consider patent neither as the only mean of appropriation nor as the most 
efficient. Lead-time or secrecy would be more efficient in securing innovation profits 
(Crampes, 1986).
4 It appears that, in most situations, a part of the firms patent and that, 
when they do, they patent a fraction of their innovations only. Globally, patenting will be 
efficient when knowledge can be easily codified and when innovations cannot be 
circumvented (Mansfield et al., 1981). 
The second category of innovation policy is to reduce the private sunk cost of R&D. This 
policy will make more research projects accepted by private parties. But it also involves 
an additional advantage when the associated knowledge is difficult to protect. Since 
subsidies are not property rights, they do not impeach the innovations to be spread 
through the imitation by competitors. And the diffusion of knowledge is always good from 
a social perspective. This paper addresses the issue of subsidies to private R&D, that is 
                                                       
3 For evidence at the firm level, see Griliches (1998) and Hall and Mairesse (1995) on the United 
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Heshmati (2001) on Sweden, Jefferson et al. (2001) on China, Van Leeuwen and Klomp (2001) on the 
Netherlands, Lööf et al. (2001) on Finland and Norway, Arvanitis and Hollenstein (2002) on Switzerland. 
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of research that is managed by the firms themselves.
5 The main difference with the 
research conducted in public institutions is that while public laboratories mostly perform 
fundamental and applied research, private firms mostly perform applied research and 
development.
6 
The goal of the subsidy policy is clear: by granting a subsidy, one hopes that additional 
research projects will take place compared to the ones that would have been done 
without public support. But there are two limits to this policy: On the one hand, the private 
return on development is a priori higher than the private return on fundamental research, 
so that the justification of private R&D subsidies is lower than the justification of public 
research. On the other hand, private firms have access to other funding opportunities, so 
that a substitution between R&D subsidies and private R&D cannot be excluded (David, 
Hall and Toole, 2000; Wallsten, 2000). 
The latter argument illustrates the very important role that the private return on innovation 
has on the efficiency of a subsidy policy. It also implies that one should be very careful 
about the nature of the performance variables used in evaluation studies. In general, it is 
clear that the less the private return on R&D the more a subsidy will be useful. It is the 
reason why standard performance measures will not be convenient for evaluation 
studies. For instance, productivity may be a good measure when R&D is privately funded, 
but it may not when it is publicly funded because the justification of the subsidy is 
precisely that the private return is to low to justify the R&D project from a private 
viewpoint. It would not be surprising that, in the latter case, we find that the private 
performance of subsidized firms is smaller than the performance of the fully privately 
funded firms. In fact, such a finding could merely mean that the subsidies were given to 
the right projects. This argument suggests that the evaluations that rely on private returns 
only could underestimate the effect of research policies. 
The simplest variable to use for the evaluation is necessarily privately funded R&D itself. 
This must be so because there can be no effect of a policy if there is a full substitution 
between public and private funds.
7 
The evaluation methodology is equally important. What we need to evaluate is the 
difference between the private funding that firms have made with the subsidy and the 
private funding they would have made without it. In order to evaluate this difference, we 
use the propensity score method introduced by Rubin (1974), where subsidized firms are 
matched with the most similar unsubsidized firms. 
                                                       
5 Notice that this research can be made by the firm itself or in cooperation with other private or public 
institutions. 
6 For evidence in France, see Crépon and Duguet (1996).  
7 This explains why such a large number of studies focus on this variable. See David, Hall and Toole 
(2000) for a survey. 
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The second section presents a theoretical analysis of the effect of subsidies and links it to 
recent previous studies in the field. The data are presented in the third section and the 
methodology in section 4. The last section presents our results. 
1  Theoretical background and previous empirical studies 
This section presents a simple model of R&D subsidies and a discussion of the results of 
previous studies. The estimates that we provide in this paper can be interpreted as a non-
parametric estimation of this model. However, it is important to notice that none of the 
assumptions of this model is needed to perform the estimation. In a first step, we 
establish the conditions under which substitution happens between private R&D and 
subsidies. In a second step, we derive the empirical counterpart implied by the theoretical 
model in order to easier the interpretation of the empirical analysis that follows. 
1.1 The  model 
We consider a situation in which a ministry (or an agency) offers subsidies to innovative 
firms. Any firm can apply for a subsidy and must provide information on its research 
project, including the amount of privately funded R&D. After considering this information, 
the ministry decides the amount of public support it grants to the firm on an individual 
basis.
8 The projects that do no include any privately funded R&D are excluded from the 
subsidy system.
9 We represent the functioning of this public support system by a Nash  
(1953) bargaining process on both the amount of privately funded R&D and the amount 
of the subsidy. 
On the one hand, firms maximize profits and can apply for a subsidy even if they do not 
need it. It will be the case when the private return on R&D is high. On the other hand, we 
assume that the ministry seeks to maximize the total amount of R&D that the firms 
perform. This assumption can be justified by the goal of maximizing the number of 
innovations, which depend on the total amount invested. Moreover, it accounts for 
possible substitution effects, since a decrease of private R&D lowers total R&D. 
We distinguish two cases, which correspond to two different threat points of the 
bargaining process. In the first case, the private return on R&D is so low that no 
innovation project would be undertaken with private funds. The subsidies should be 
efficient. In the second case, the private return on R&D is high enough for the research to 
be privately funded and we expect substitution to take place between public and private 
funds. 
                                                       
8 Decisions taken on an individual basis creates an important difference with the R&D tax credit that is 
attributed on an automatic basis. 
9 This assumption was motivated by our data.  6 
The goal of our model is to determine the difference between the amount of privately 
funded R&D when the firm has a subsidy (denoted  1 R ) and the amount of privately 
funded R&D the firm would have invested without a subsidy (denoted  0 R ). The effect of 
the subsidy is denoted: 
0 1 R R c - =  
The profit function of the firm is given by: 
()( ) R A R V A , R - + = P  
Where R is privately funded R&D, A the subsidy and V the revenue of total research that 
can be obtained either directly by a production activity or indirectly through the trade of 
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Where x is the total amount invested in R&D. This specific form has three interesting 
properties. First, it assumes that sales are proportional to total R&D, a stylized fact that 
has been documented by many econometric studies (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). 
Second, the private return on R&D is represented by one parameter,  f , that depends on 
the imitation rate of products, the enforcement of intellectual property rights or the 
anticipated market power of the firm. Third, it implies that the optimal amount of R&D has 
a Tobit shape, where there is no investment if the private return on R&D is too low and a 
continuum of investments when it is high, since each firm will invest a different amount 
depending on the value of its firm-levelf  parameter.
10 
The ministry aims to maximize total R&D expenditures. Its gain function is thus: 
() A R A , R G + =  











This gain will thus be lower in the presence of substitution between public and private 
funds ( 0 < ¶ ¶ A R ), so that the ministry will has an incentive to restrict the allocation of 
subsidies when substitution takes place. 
The objectives of the two players (firm and ministry) lead to maximize the following Nash 
bargaining criterion: 
                                                       
10 The tobit form of R&D investment is a standard of the econometrics of research. See Bound et al. 
(1984) on American data and Crépon, Duguet and Kabla (1996) on French data.   7 
() () () ( ) () q q - - P - P = 0
1
0 G R , A G R , A R , A N  
Where  [] 1 0, Î q  represents the bargaining power of the ministry and () 0 0 G , P  the threat 
points that are defined as the gains of the two players when no subsidy is granted (i.e., a 
bargaining failure is often represented as the non-cooperative outcome of the game). The 
bargaining power of the ministry depends on the conditions applying to the grant of 
subsidies and on the number of firms competing for a fixed subsidy budget. We must 
consider two cases that involve two different threat points: 
-  When the private return on R&D is low, the firm would not invest in R&D without a 
subsidy and the ministry would records no R&D. The threat point is 
() ( ) 0 0 0 0 , G , = P . 
-  When the private return on R&D is high, the firms would invest an amount  0 R  
and the threat point is () ( ) () 0 0 0 0 0 R , , R G , P = P  
1.2  When the private return on R&D is low 
In this situation, the firm does not invest without a subsidy. The condition is that there 
exists no private R&D amount that provides a positive profit: 
11 
() ( ) 1 0 0 1 0 < f Þ > " < - f = P R R , R  
In this situation, the optimal amount of private R&D is  0 0 = R  so that  . 0 0 = P  The firm 
has therefore to apply for a subsidy in order to realize its research project. The project 
must have a part that is privately funded. The Nash criterion is equal to: 
() () ( ) () ( ) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 < f < + f + - f = - - P = q q - q q - , R A A R G N  
The first result is that the ministry has interest in spending its entire subsidy budget since: 
() 0 0 > " >
¶
¶























and the subsidy will be granted only if the firm invests some money of its own into the 
project: 
q - > f Û > 1 0 1 R  
                                                       
11 It is equivalent to say that the maximum of profit is negative.  8 
If the ministry has a strong bargaining power (q  close to 1) this condition reduces to 
0 > f  and all the projects that have a low private return will be undertaken. In this case, 
we can show that the whole revenue of the firm is invested in R&D. In the other cases, 
the lower the private return on R&D the less the firm invests. 
Overall, the effect of subsidies on private R&D when the private return is low equals: 
1 1 0 1
1









= - = A R R c  
As expected, it is when the private return on R&D is low that subsidies can have a 
positive effect on private R&D. 
1.3  When the private return on R&D is high 
In this situation  1 > f , the private R&D activity is profitable. The optimal investment 
equals: 
R R = 0  
and the corresponding profit equals: 
()0 1 0 > - f = P R . 
Even though the firm does not need public support, it has an obvious interest to apply for 
a subsidy anyway. The Nash criterion equals: 




0 > f - + - f - f + - f = - P - P =
q q - q q - , R R A R A R G G N  
This can be simplified to: 
() () ( ) q q - + f + - f = c A A c N 1 1  
with  R R c - =  that measures directly the effect of the subsidy at the optimum (in this 
case:  0 1 R R c - = ). The shape of function N is the same as the one of the previous 
section, but with c instead of R. Therefore, we find that the ministry has an incentive to 
spend all its budget and that the optimal level of private R&D equals: 
1 1
1









- = R A R R . 
There is always a substitution effect. Nevertheless, this effect is limited by the following 
participation condition: 






q + - f
- f
= < Û >
1
1
0 1 .  9 
The ministry has an interest in limiting the subsidy it grants to the firms that participate to 
the project. Therefore a part of the substitution effect will never take place because the 
firms need to put some money of their own. 
Overall, there is always a decrease of private R&D expenditures when a subsidy is 
granted to projects with a high private return: 
1 0 1
1









- = - = A R R c  
This model provides a simple rule to determine whether a research project would have 
needed public funds or not: firms that decrease their private R&D after a subsidy grant 
are likely to have a private return that is high enough to fund the research of their own. 
This property can be linked to our evaluation method. 
1.4  Interpretation of econometric results 
The data include both projects that need public funds and projects that do not. Therefore, 
we will observe a weighted average of the effects c  (substitution case) and c  
(complement case).  
Our results imply that the estimated effect of subsidies can vary over time depending on 
the variations of appropriability conditions and the bargaining power of the ministry. The 
first parameter depends on many conditions: the enforcement of property rights, the 
nature of the knowledge that is developed over time, the fact that the ministry prefers to 
give support to different technologies over time or simply the variations of the 
expectations of the firm about the private value of the innovative products and processes. 
The second parameter may vary according to the amount of subsidy available: when a 
small budget is available the bargaining power of the ministry may be stronger because 
firms compete for subsidies, when the budget is large the ministry may be tempted to 
give either higher subsidies to the same projects or to increase the number of recipients. 
In this case we should expect that beyond some threshold of average subsidies - below 
some threshold of bargaining power - substitution effects could occur. 
According to the model, we will examine two measures of performance. The first one is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm has maintained or increased its privately 
funded R&D. The second measure is the growth rate of privately funded R&D. The use of 
growth rates instead of levels in the latter case is further motivated by the need to 
eliminate fixed effects when performing the evaluation (see Crépon and Iung, 1999, 
appendix 2).  10
1.5  Previous studies and the model 
The recent studies that we comment use a methodology that is comparable to ours and 
are natural background for international comparisons.
12 We discuss their result according 
to the model. 
Toivanen and Niininen (1998) examine whether R&D subsidies are substitutes or 
complements to the private funding of innovative activities. They study this issue on 
Finish data over the period 1985-1993. The subsidies can represent as much as 50% of 
the total R&D budget and a loan can be granted up to 60% of the total funding. For the 
small firms, the thresholds are increased by 10%. Two main results are obtained. On the 
one hand, for the large firms, the R&D subsidies would have no effect on the private 
funding of private R&D. On the other hand, for the small firms, the subsidies would 
increase the private funding of R&D by 5%. Globally, a simple addition effect dominates. 
Since the small firms are likely to experience less favorable appropriability conditions, 
these results are compatible with our model. 
Busom (1999) studies the effect of the R&D subsidies given by the Spanish ministry of 
industry in 1998, that funds on average 39% of the total R&D budget. A first look at the 
data shows that theses subsidies are more often granted to small-sized firms that have 
applied for a large number of patents over the ten years before the subsidy was 
granted.
13 The results are mixed. On the one hand, for two firms out of three, the 
subsidies increase the private funding of R&D by 20%. On the other hand, for the 
remaining third of the firms, there would be a complete crowding out. The explanation of 
this result could simply be that a third of the firms benefit from good appropriability 
condition. It also shows that the global effects of subsidies that are measured in applied 
studies are the aggregation of positive and negative effects, so that the heterogeneity of 
the effect of subsidies should be accounted for in the evaluation. Our methodology will 
therefore account for it. 
Wallsten (2000) studies the impact of the Small Business Innovation Research Program 
(SBIR) on American data between 1990 and 1992. In 1998, one billion dollar has been 
spent on it. In the first step, the agencies can grant a subsidy of one hundred thousand 
dollars to a firm in order to examine the possibility to implement an idea (the applied 
research step). In a second step, the agencies can grant a subsidy up to seven and fifty 
hundred thousand dollars to implement the project that had been supported in the first 
step (the development step). In a third step, no subsidy is granted but the firm has to 
market its product or to use its process. The conclusion of the author is that the R&D 
investment would have been made even without the subsidies; the reason advocated is 
that the projects selected by the agencies tend to favor the projects with the highest 
                                                       
12 Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that the type of subsidy granted varies from one 
country to another. 
13 A part of the subsidies are financed the European Union. When this type of public support is 
considered, the author finds that the attribution of a subsidy increases with the size of the firm.  11
probability of commercial success. And this is equivalent to select the projects with the 
highest private return on R&D. The conclusion of the model therefore applies and a full 
crowding-out would not be surprising. This paper is also interesting because it shows that 
the substitution between subsidies and private R&D can originate in the criterion that the 
agencies use to grant the subsidies. 
Lach (2000) studies the effect of R&D subsidies on Israeli data over 1990-1995. The 
public support is given by the ministry of industry and foreign trade and represented 120 
millions of dollars in 1988 and 310 millions of dollars in 1990. The granting criterion is the 
ability of the firm to export its research output and most projects have a flat subsidy rate 
of 50%. Therefore, a reduction of private R&D involves a reduction of the subsidy. Such a 
mechanism should entice firms to maintain their private R&D.
14 The first part of the study 
uses matching methods while the second part uses regression methods on balanced 
panel data. The first part concludes that subsidies add to the private funding of R&D 
(table 10, page 24). This first result is confirmed by the first panel data regressions that 
uses a subsidy dummy variable (table 11, p. 29). Therefore, the author first finds an 
addition effect. The second part of the study relies on a very different methodology and 
estimates a reduced form on the subsidy level. The author finds a different result: one 
additional dollar of R&D would increase private R&D of 41 cents on the long run. 
Therefore, there would be a positive effect of R&D subsidies. Since exporting firms face 
international competition and can have more appropriability problems abroad that on their 
home market, the positive effect on private R&D was expected. However, the first result, 
an addition of subsidies and private R&D, suggest that the average effect of subsidies 
may be an aggregation of positive and negative effects so that the effect of subsidies on 
private R&D may be heterogeneous. 
Finally, Czarnitzki and Fier (2001, 2002) study the effect of subsidies on the German 
firms operating in services over 1994-1998. In their first study, the authors use standard 
regression methods and find that on average one Euro of subsidy would increase private 
R&D by 1.3 to 1.4 Euros. In the second study, the authors implement matching methods 
and show that the average private R&D to sales ratio is higher (by 8 points) among 
subsidized firms. However, no analysis of the growth rate of R&D has been made. The 
results go in the same direction than Lach (2000) but with a stronger impact of subsidies 
on R&D. This difference can also be explained by our model: the firms in services would 
have more difficulties to protect their knowledge because the property rights - at the time 
of the study - allow for less protection in services than in industry (where patents can be 
used more efficiently). Therefore we should expect - as long as the German legislation is 
not changed to cover business methods, for instance - that the effect of subsidies should 
be stronger in services. 
                                                       
14 A similar mechanism is present under the R&D tax credit, for which a positive effect is found on 
privately funded R&D (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000).  12
2  The data 
2.1 Sources 
The quantitative data come from two sources: the « BRN » (from INSEE), that are the 
fiscal files for all firms above ten employees, and the R&D survey (from the Ministry of 
Research).
15 The BRN provide information about the line of business of the firms as well 
as their main accounting data. The research survey provides information about the R&D 
investments and the subsidies granted by all the ministries in France. It does not include 
information about the R&D tax credit.
16 The main sources of funding are the Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Research. In order to keep the larger 
number of firms in our analysis we have made 12 separate samples including to 
consecutive years over the period 1985-1997. The necessity to include two year of 
consecutive data comes from the fact that we work on growth rates and that we need 
lagged control variables for estimating the subsidy granting equation. The details of the 
dataset are presented in appendix 1. Depending on the year, the samples include 
between 1032 and 1672 research performers in both industry and services. 
2.2  Sample statistics 
The total R&D expenditures of the sample are strongly increasing up to 1991, is stable up 
to 1994 and then decreases (Figure 1). The origin of this decrease mainly comes from 
the decrease of subsidies. Indeed, private R&D slightly decreases since 1995 while the 
subsidies decrease since 1992. In order to correct these first results for the variation of 
the number of firms in the sample, we have computed the average R&D expenditures 
(Figure 2). Over the same period, the average R&D expenditures are first increasing up 
to 1991, where they reach ten million Euros and then steadily decrease to reach a little 
more than 8 millions Euros in 1997. This evolution can be decomposed between the 
publicly and the privately funded R&D. The average privately funded R&D is increasing 
up to 1993 (8.5 billions Euros) where it decreases to a stable value of 8 millions Euros. 
But this decrease cannot explain the decrease of the average total R&D expenditures. An 
important part of that fall comes from the R&D subsidies. At the beginning of the period 
(1985-1991), where the average subsidy oscillates between 1.5 and 2 millions Euros, the 
average subsidy decreases steadily down to 0.6 million Euros in 1997. Globally, the 
decrease in public funding has not been compensated by an increase in private funding. 
These first results are interesting if we consider them in the debate about crowding-out 
effects. If there was a substitution between the variations of public and private funds, we 
                                                       
15 The statistical treatment on the BRN files has been made at INSEE «  Marchés et Stratégies 
d’Entreprises » Division. 
16 This is because the R&D tax credit in not managed by the Ministry of Research. This should not be 
a problem to our study since all firms can apply to the R&D tax credit under the same conditions.  13
should observe a negative correlation between public and private R&D. The Figure 2 
shows that this is the case on two short periods only, in 1987-1989 and 1991-1993 where 
a decrease of public funds happens at the same time as an increase in private funds. But 
over the whole period, out of twelve variations, only four do not contradict the substitution 
hypothesis. The other cases that we see are either an increase of both public and private 
funds (1985-87 and 1989-91) or a decrease of both (1993-97). 
The origin of this decrease of public funds is illustrated in Figure 3. The fall comes from 
the subsidies granted by the Ministry of Defense. After a relative stability around 1.3 
millions Euros up to 1991, the average subsidy diminishes steadily down to 0.4 millions of 
Euros in 1997, that is three times less. 
Looking more in the details of the fall, we should distinguish the variation of the number of 
recipients from the variation of the average amount granted to each recipient (Table 1). In 
1985, one firm out of three benefited from a subsidy, in 1997, the ratio is one firm out of 
four. Over the same period, the share of publicly funded R&D felt from 24% to 7% of the 
total R&D expenditures. 
Table 2 describes the entry and the exit from the subsidy system. The majority of firms do 
not have subsidies (65% in 1997) and at the same date 22% had a subsidy for two years 
in a row. Overall, the stability of the recipients is rather strong. The percentage of entrants 
in the subsidy system is 5% and the percentage of firms that exit the subsidy system is 
7%. The latter figure is higher because the fall in subsidy has been made partly by 
reducing the number of recipients.  
However, this decrease of the number of recipients cannot explain alone the fall of the 
public funding. Figure 4 shows that the average subsidy by recipient has strongly 
diminished since 1991, from about 6 millions Euros to about 2 millions Euros. This 
decrease will have different effects on the private funding on R&D depending on whether 
there is substitution or not. A first look at this issue can be obtained from Table 3 that 
compare the average performances of the supported and the non-supported firms. Two 
performance measures have been retained for our analysis: the fact to have maintained 
of increased the privately funded R&D (dummy variable) and the growth rate of private 
R&D. 
Overall, the percentage of firms that have maintained or increased their private funding is 
significantly higher among firms that have not been supported for 5 years out of 12. 
These first results would rather go for the substitution hypothesis. But the comparison of 
the growth rates show that the difference is significant for one year only (in 1987), a result 
that goes against the substitution hypothesis. 
The comparison of Table 3 however could suffer from a selection bias, since it sums up 
both the effects of the subsidies and of all the characteristics of the firms that are 
correlated with it. For instance, we will see later that the supported firms do not have the 
same size and do not operate in the same lines of business than the non-supported ones. 
The comparison could therefore reflect the latter differences rather than the effect of 
subsidies. In order to fix that problem, we use matching methods.  14
3 Methodology 
3.1  The evaluation problem 
The methodology used in this study starts from the causal model of Rubin (1974) 
designed to evaluate the effect of a treatment from non-experimental data.
17 According to 
this approach, a treatment (denoted T) is applied to a sample of individuals with 
characteristics  X in order to improve their performance y. Here, the treatment is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm got a subsidy (T=1) or not (T=0). We assume that each 
firm will react in a different way to the subsidy so that it has two potential outcomes:
18  
-  () 0 i y  if the firm is not supported; 
-  () 1 i y  if the firm gets a subsidy. 
What we seek to evaluate, the “causal effect”, defined as the difference between these 
two potential outcomes,  () () 0 1 i i i y y c - = . More precisely, three quantities are of interest: 
-  () () () 0 1 i i y y E c - =  : the average effect of the subsidies on the whole population of 
firms; 
-  () () () 1 0 1 1 = - = T y y E c i i  : the average effect on the treated. It is the standard 
definition of the evaluation;  
-  () () () 0 0 1 0 = - = T y y E c i i  :  the  average  effect  on  the  non-treated,  which 
measures the opportunity to grant subsidies to the firms that do not have it. 
The relationship between these three quantities is given by: 
[] [] 1 0 1 0 = + = = T Pr c T Pr c c . 
This relationship is important because it implies that a negative global effect (c) can 
originate from two different cases: either  0 1 < c , when the subsidy is not efficient among 
the supported firms, or  0 0 < c , when the subsidy would not be efficient on the not-
supported firms. This is why one should be cautious when interpreting the results of the 
standard regression methods. In the standard case, these regressions estimate c, not  1 c , 
so that a negative global effect can be found even when the effect on the treated is 
positive. This problem is more likely to happen when the probability to get a subsidy is 
                                                       
17 For a comprehensive presentation see Rubin (1997), on the developments of the methodology see 
Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2002). 
18 One reason why the effect may vary from one firm to another is simply that the subsidies come from 
different ministries. Moreover, the previous empirical studies in the field show a significant amount of 
heterogeneity in the responses of the firms to R&D subsidies.  15
low, since this probability is the weight of the effect on the treated in the average effect 
equation. This problem does occur in our data. 
The evaluation problem is that one cannot observe  () 1 i y  and  () 0 i y  at the same time. 
Either the firm is subsidized and we observe  () 1 i y , or it is not and we observe  () 0 i y . The 
observable outcome is therefore equal to: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) {} 1 0 1 1 0 , T , T y T y T y i i i i i i i Î + - = . 
What we need to evaluate are thus the expectation of  () 0 i y  for the firms that have been 
subsidized, and the expectation of  () 1 i y  for the firms that have not been. It is the problem 
of the comparison group. For instance, in order to evaluate c1, we need to select firms 
that have not been treated but that would have behaved like the treated. 
3.2  The naïve estimator 
The simplest method reduces to take the difference of the averages  i y0  and  i y1  in order 
to estimate  () 0 y E  and  () 1 y E , like in Table 3. But this comparison implicitly assumes that 
the conditional and the marginal expectations are equal:  () () 0 0 0 = = T y E y E  and 
() () 1 1 1 = = T y E y E . These equalities can be obtained when one assumes that the 
treatment is independent of the performance, that is: 
() () { } 1 0, k , y E k T y E T y k k Î = = Þ ^  
It is clear that this assumption is too strong for this study because it would imply that the 
private funding of research without public support is independent from belonging to the 
group of the subsidized firms. To illustrate the problem further, the difference of averages 
is the empirical counterpart of: 
() ()
() () () ()
b + =
= - = + = - = =
= - = = g
1
0 0 0 1
1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1
c
T y E T y E T y E T y E
T y E T y E
 
where  b  is the selection bias. This bias is equal to zero only if the performance without 
public support is the same among treated and non-treated firms. This holds under the 
assumption: 
() () . y E T y E T y 0 0 0 0 = = Þ ^   16
and we have many reasons to believe that this condition will not be fulfilled in our study.
19 
Among them: 
-  The firms in the two groups do not have the same size and R&D investment is 
proportional to size ; 
-  The firms in the two groups do not operate in the same lines of business and the 
appropriability conditions, the demand and the technological opportunities vary 
strongly among different lines of business ; 
-  The firms that have a subsidy often had one in the past and this may influence 
their private investment in R&D through the projects they have begun. 
Therefore we need to generalize the naïve estimation method by relaxing its 
assumptions. 
3.3  The conditional estimator 
If we had experimental samples, we could use the difference of the average 
performances. Here, it is not possible because the subsidies are not attributed at random 
due to the existence of a policy. The simplest method is thus to find attributes X such 
that, among firms that have similar attributes, the allocation of the treatment can be 
considered as attributed at random. The identification assumption for the effect on the 
treated is: 
20 
() () () () () X , T y E X , T y E X T y 0 0 1 0 0 = = = Þ ^  
Under this assumption, the causal effect is given by: 
() () ()
() () () ()
() () () () X , T y E X , T y E
X , T y E X , T y E
X , T y y E c
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1
= - = =
= - = =
= - =
 
Integrating over X, we get the average causal effect on the treated. Hence, one needs to 
regroup firms in homogenous X classes before to make a comparison. The most popular 
method is to match each treated firm with its non-treated neighbors (Rubin, 1979). The 
first applications of this method used discriminant analysis to constitute homogenous 
groups of firms before to compare their performances.
21 For instance, Rosenbaum and 
                                                       
19 The arguments that follow rely on the literature on the determinants of R&D. See Cohen et Levin 
(1989) and Crépon, Duguet and Kabla (1996). 
20 The argument is symmetric for the effect on the non-treated so that we do not develop it here. 
21 On the link between discriminant analysis and the logit model see Maddala (1983).  17
Rubin (1985) compare the Mahalanobis distance method with the logit model.
 Finally the 
latter method became a standard due to its performance and its simplicity. 
The reason why we do not work directly on the whole set of attributes is that it would 
involve a multidimensional matching that would rapidly become intractable. For instance, 
if we have 10 lagged size classes, 10 industries, 2 classes of past public support and 10 
classes of lagged private R&D ratios, we would need to consider 10x20x2x10= 4000 
possible cells and evaluate the effect of the treatment in each of it. The propensity score 
method reduces this multidimensional problem to matching on a real number, the 
probability to get the treatment. Moreover, this propensity score method relies on a very 
interesting intuition given below. 
3.4  The propensity score 
The propensity score method is based on the following result by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983): 
() () [ ] X T Pr T y X T y 1 0 0 = ^ Þ ^ . 
Then, one need to compare firms that have the same probability to be treated, called the 
propensity score. The intuition of this method is the following: in an experimental sample 
we can compare the averages because the allocation of the treatment in random. Now 
suppose that this is not the case, and consider a group of firms that have the same 
probability to be treated. In this group, there are firms that have been treated and firms 
that have not been treated, hence the allocation of the treatment can be considered as 
random inside this group of firms. This implies that one can evaluate the causal effect 
inside this group by taking the difference of the average performances between the 
treated and the non-treated firms. 
In practice, we need to match each treated firm with the non-treated firms that have the 
same probability to be treated and to compute the difference of their performances. 
Repeating this operation for all the treated firms and taking the average of these 
differences will provide an estimate of the effect of the treatment. 
The only problem is whether we can find firms with the same propensity score when their 
treatment is different.
22 It is unlikely to be the case for all the values of the propensity 
score for the following reason: firms that have a strong probability to get the treatment will 
tend to be much more often treated, and the contrary for firms that have a small 
probability to be treated. Hence, the comparison will generally be impossible at both ends 
of the probability distribution. Only a part of the data will be useful for the comparison. 
Therefore, we will first look at the propensity score distributions among the treated and 
the non-treated and give the percentage of firms that belong to the common support of 
                                                       
22 The absence of treatment can be considered as a specific  treatment.  18
these distributions. In practice, it will never be far from 80% in this study so that the 
comparison is possible. 
3.5  Selection of the attributes 
We have a last problem to solve: what variables should be included in the attributes? It is 
clear that the only variables that can influence the evaluation are either the ones that 
determine the selection (T) or the ones that influence the performance (y). More 
precisely, we can restrict our attention to the intersection of these variables for the 
following reasons: 
·  The variables that do not influence the treatment (T) cannot influence the 
evaluation by definition since they create no selection and thus no selection 
bias. 
·  The variables that do not influence the treatment (T) but that do influence the 
performance (y) can also be discarded because they create no selection and 
therefore cannot create a selection bias as well.  
·  The variables that influence the treatment (T) but that do not influence the 
performance can also be discarded. They create a selection but since they 
do not influence the distribution of the performance, there is a selection 
without a selection bias. 
·  The attributes (X) must be chosen in the common determinants of the 
treatment  (T) and of the performance (y). These determinants can be found 
in the theoretical literature on R&D investment and from an analysis of the 
subsidy granting process. 
·  It is also clear that the attributes (X) may never depend on the treatment (T). 
This is a reason why using lagged variables can be useful. 
A simple rule for the selection of the conditioning variables is to start from the 
determinants of the performance, that we can identify from the theoretical and applied 
literatures, and then to eliminate the variables that are not significant in the attribution of 
the treatment. This last step can be made from the estimation of a logit model explaining 
the allocation of the treatment. 
3.6 Evaluation  method 
There are many ways to match firms.
23 In this paper, following Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1998), we use the Nadaraya-Watson (non-parametric) estimator of the average 
effect. For each treated firm, we compute the difference between its performance and a 
                                                       
23 See Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997).  19
local weighted average of the performances of its non-treated neighbors, where the 
weight decreases with the difference of the propensity score. 
The kernel estimator of  () [ ] 1 0 = T y E i  is defined as: 
() [] 0
0
1 0 I i , y T y E ˆ j
I j
j i Î ´ w = = å
Î





h p p K
h p p K








where  i p  is the propensity score of the (treated) firm i,  j p the propensity score of the 
(non-treated) firm j, K(x) is a gaussian kernel, h the window and  0 I  the set of firms that 
got no subsidy.
 24  
The average causal effect on the treated is obtained by: 
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similarly the effects on the non-treated and on the whole population are estimated 
respectively by: 
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These estimators are asymptotically normal and their variances are obtained by the 
bootstrap. We use the method of Andrews and Buchinsky (2000) in order to determine 
the number of bootstrap repetitions (see appendix 3).
25 Notice that the logit model is re-
estimated at each simulation. The common support of the propensity score is also 
determined at each simulation, and is defined by the intersection of the probabilities 
intervals of the treated and of the non-treated firms, defined by their first and 99
th 
percentiles. The estimation was performed using SAS-Logistic procedure and SAS-IML. 
                                                       
24 In order to make this estimation we took a Silverman window. For more information about this non-
parametric estimation method, see Härdle (1990). 
25 On the bootstrap, see Efron and Tibshirani (1993).  20
4 Results 
4.1 The  logit  model 
The first step of the evaluation method is to choose the attributes. We take the variables 
that influence both the probability to get public support and the investment in private 
R&D. Five determinants are significant.
26  
1.  Line of business. On the one hand, this variable summarizes the conditions of 
demand, technology and appropriation that determine R&D investments. On the other 
hand, it influences the attribution of public support because the policy technology 
objectives are correlated to the lines of business that use these technologies. 
2.  Size (lagged). On the one hand, the proportionality of R&D investments to size is a 
stylized fact with theoretical support (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). On the other hand, it 
is likely that large size firms more often get subsidies than the small ones. 
3.  The private R&D to sales ratio (lagged). On the one hand, it influences current R&D 
investment because the research programs last over several years before 
completion. On the other hand, it influences the granting of subsidies because the 
firms that do the more R&D are the ones that are the most likely to apply for 
subsidies. An additional argument is that we study the growth rate of private R&D so 
that one needs to include its lagged value among the regressors in order to obtain 
estimates that are robust to fixed effects (see Crépon and Iung, 1999, appendix 2). 
4.  The Debt to Sales ratio (lagged). On the one hand, it influences R&D investment 
through the financial constraint and, on the other hand, it influences subsidy 
applications by the firms or the granting of the subsidies by the ministry. 
5.  Past public support. First, it influences the private R&D investments since the 
research is made on several years. Second, the public support can be granted on 
several years. Last, it summarizes unobservable characteristics linked to the ability of 
the firm to get public support.
27  We use two variables for the past public support: 
first, a dummy variable that equals one when the firm got a subsidy at least once in 
the past. Second, among the firms that had a subsidy, we have computed the 
                                                       
26 For a justification and regressions about the determinants of R&D and innovation on French data, 
see Crépon, Duguet and Kabla (1996). 
27 Using the past values of public support is sometimes advocated to account for firm-level fixed 
effects (see Geroski, Van Reenen and Walters, 2002, p. 37). Here, we have few entry and exit so that the 
estimation of a fixed effect logit model is not  possible. Moreover, with that method we would need to impose 
that the coefficients are stable over time.  21
average subsidy rate. These two variables therefore control for both the fact to get a 
subsidy and for its importance in the total R&D budget.
28 
All the explanative variables are lagged in order to avoid simultaneity issues. The results 
are presented in the Tables 4 and 5. Overall we find that the probability to get a subsidy: 
1.  Increases with size measured by sales; 
2.  Increases with the private R&D to Sales ratio;  
3.  Increases with the Debt to Sales ratio, for most years; 
4.  Increases with the existence and importance of a past public support; 
5.  Varies with the line of business. 
Globally, the predictions of the logit model are good, from 85% to 90% of concordant 
predictions. The latter figures strongly depend on the introduction of the past public 
support among the regressors. Without it, the percentage of concordant prediction falls to 
65%. Therefore, including past public support is likely to influence the quality of the 
matching. This conclusion is close to the analysis of Lach (2000). 
Our results are interesting at the light of the theoretical model. The fact that the debt to 
sales ratio increases the probability to get a subsidy suggests that the firms that have a 
stronger financial constraint are more likely to be supported. This could explain the result 
of the comparison between the supported and the non-supported firms (Table 3), where 
only one difference out of twelve is significant.  
The second interesting result is on the relationship between the past private R&D 
investment and the probability to get a subsidy. We find that the higher the private R&D 
ratio the higher the probability to get a subsidy. This validates our assumption that the 
ministries account for the part of the R&D project that is privately funded when they make 
their decisions. This result goes in the same direction than the first one and could also 
explain why our sample statistics reveal few substitution effects. 
Finally, we also find that size significantly increases the access to public support. This 
shows that the access to subsidies would be less open than the access to fiscal 
measures (like the R&D tax credit).
29 It is also likely that the large firms face better 
appropriability conditions so that this type of selection would in fact let substitution effects 
appear. However, in the case of the large firms, it is possible that international 
competition reduces their market power. 
                                                       
28 We have also examined what happens when we use one lag only. It did not affect our results. 
29 One could reply that when the tax credit is attributed on the basis of the growth of R&D 
expenditures, the large firms may be at a disadvantage.  22
Overall, we find that the allocation of subsidies includes some mechanism that tends to 
reduce the substitution effects but that there remains some room for crowding-out effects.  
4.2  The effect of subsidies on privately funded R&D 
The estimations by matching are presented in Table 6. We estimate three quantities: the 
global effect of subsidies c, that is the effect the subsidies would have if they were given 
to all the firms in the sample; the effect on the treated c1 which is the evaluation strictly 
speaking and the effect on the non treated c0  that represents the effect that the subsidies 
would have if they had been given to the firms that did not have public support. 
The effect of subsidies is indeed heterogeneous, as the previous studies in the field 
already suggested. In our case, it means that the effect on the treated is sometimes 
different from the effect on the non-treated. For the twelve couples of years under study, 
the subsidies have no effect on the proportion of firms that have maintained or increased 
their private R&D expenditures (at the 5% level). Only one effect is negative at the 10% 
level in 1987. Therefore we find an addition effect. The picture is different for the effect on 
the firms that did not have a subsidy: it is negative for five years (four year at the 5% 
level) therefore suggesting that the subsidized firms have been well selected. As we saw, 
the determinants of the subsidy grant may explain this results: firm with high debt to sales 
ratio and high private R&D ratios are more often selected that the others, so that the 
effect of the subsidies may be stronger on the treated.  
We can therefore reach the following conclusion: the global effect is negative for four 
years out of twelve but this is not because the subsidies would have crowd-out private 
R&D, it is because the global effect is a weighted average of the effect on the subsidized 
firms and on the unsubsidized firms and that the latter is negative. In other words, except 
for 1987, the negative sign of the global effect always comes from a potential effect on 
the firms that did not get a subsidy.  
Our second performance measure is the growth rate of private R&D. Here there is less 
heterogeneity between the treated and the non-treated. We find that the subsidies have 
in general no effect on the growth rate of private R&D. The only exception, at the 5% 
level, is in 1987 were we find again a negative effect of subsidies on the private funding 
of R&D.  
Overall we find that the subsidies add to private R&D. We should then ask why there is a 
substitution effect in 1987? The answer may well be provided by Figure 4. Year 1987 is 
the one where the average subsidy was the highest over the whole period 1985-1997, 
therefore some crowding-out is likely to have occurred from too much “generosity”.  
4.3 Extensions 
Three extensions of this work have been made. The first is to examine the growth rate of 
the R&D to sales ratio. This ratio allows correcting for the variations of R&D that would be  23
linked to size. However, in this study we match firms on size so that we should expect 
that nothing changes. This is indeed what we find in appendix 2 (table A.3). 
The two other extensions are presented in Duguet (2002b). The first one is 
methodological: we implement the weighted estimator of the causal effect proposed in 
Crépon and Iung (1999). We find that its variance is higher so that no effect is significant 
at the 5% level. However we reach the same conclusion if we perform the significance 
tests at the 10% level. 
Last, we have compared the subsidies of the Ministry of Defense with the other subsidies. 
This needs an extension of our methodology to three treatments (see Imbens, 1999; 
Lechner 2001). On the one hand, nearly all firms that have a subsidy from the Ministry of 
Defense have a subsidy from another ministry, so that we can only study the incremental 
effect of the Ministry of Defense subsidies. On the other hand, we find no difference 
between the firms that benefit from Defense subsidies and the other firms, except in 
1994. We thus face the same problem as in 1987, so that we have examined the average 
Defense subsidy in 1994: without surprise, it was the highest. This confirms that above 
some threshold, there would be a substitution between public and private R&D. 
Conclusion 
The subsidies to private R&D have been steadily decreasing in France over the 1990’s, 
which raises the issue of the effect of this decrease. Studying this issue can be made by 
studying the effect that R&D subsidies have on the private funding of research, because it 
is the basis of any subsequent effect of innovation policies on firm performance. If there 
were substitution between subsidies and private funds, the decrease of subsidies would 
not affect firm performance and conversely, if subsidies and private funds were 
complementary, the reduction of subsidies would decrease the total R&D effort and 
therefore the number of innovations and firms performance.  
We first examine the granting of the subsidies. We find that a firm as higher chances to 
get a subsidy if it has a high debt to sales ratio, a high private R&D to sales ratio and a 
higher size. The access to subsidies is therefore more restricted than the access to R&D 
tax credit, however the accent that is put on the financial situation of the firm and on its 
involvement in private R&D suggest that there exist in the subsidy system some 
mechanism that try to prevent the substitution between the public and the private funds. 
In a second step, we examine the effect of subsidies on private R&D with matching 
methods. We find that, at the exception of 1987, no significant substitution effect appears. 
The most probable reason why 1987 exhibits a substitution is that this is the year where 
the average subsidy was the highest (over 1985-1997). This result can however be 
obtained only if we compute the effect of subsidies on the firms that got it (i.e., on the 
treated). We global effect (over the whole sample) is sometimes found to be negative, but 
this result comes from a potential effects of subsidies on the firms that did not get one 
(i.e., on the non-treated). The methodology is therefore important.  24
Overall, we find that R&D subsidies adds to private R&D. But such an effect implies that 
the reduction of subsidies is unlikely to have been compensated by inverse movements 
of private funds, so that a lower innovation-related performance cannot be ignored. Of 
course, this conclusion would hold only if other sources of funding, private or public, 
would not be promoted.  
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Appendix 1: The data 
We work on two-year datasets. The reason is that we want to avoid one problem 
associated with mergers or when a firm sells one of its departments. The capital per 
capita plays an important role on the discarding of firms when cleaning a dataset. The 
reason may be that buyouts or selling a part of the firm more often affect R&D firms than 
the others. However, our method drops these firms only during the capital modifications 
because our two-year samples are made independently for each couple year. For 
instance, a firm that would make a buyout on year t would be discarded from the sample 
at times t –1 and t but would be reintegrated in the next sample on years t from t+1. This 
is why we have much more firms than in a balanced panel. If we had a balanced panel, 
we would have about 300 firms only on the period 1985-97. With our method we end up 
with three to four more times firms depending on the couple of years studied.  
Cleaning on the annual datasets (Table A.1) 
The samples are obtained from the merger between the accounting data (BRN, INSEE) 
and the Research Survey (Ministère de la Recherche). We first eliminate the outlyiers on 
the logarithms of the following per capita variables and then on the growth rates of the 
same variables: 
  Production / Personnel (BRN) 
  Value Added / Personnel (BRN) 
  Capital / Personnel (BRN) 
  Total R&D expenditures / Personnel (R&D survey) 
  R&D Personnel / Personnel (R&D survey) 
Our cleaning method can be decomposed in two steps. In a first step, we sort the data 
according to the variable on which we make the cleaning, in a second step we compute 
the gap between each value and its closest neighbor located after it. If the gap is too 
important, all the point located beyond the value are discarded. The process starts from 
the median first in increasing order and then in decreasing order. This method has the 
advantage to be efficient when the distribution studied is asymmetric because it does not 
imply to put the same limit at the left and at the right of the mean or the median. In a 
second step, we check the effect of the cleaning on the distribution graphically in order to 
avoid any truncation due to the method. After these graphical checks we have decided to 
discard the points when the difference between to subsequent value is 0.2 which means 
20% since our variables are in logarithms. Even though this condition looks tolerant, it 
leads to keep between the two thirds and the three fourths of our sample depending on 
the year.   28
Cleaning on the two-year datasets 
We apply the same methodology to the growth rates (difference of logarithms) of the 
same variables. Here two types of losses are possible: First, the ones that come from the 
mergers themselves and, second, the ones that come from the cleaning. The loss from 
the merger mostly comes from entry and exit and the fact that some firms in the R&D 
survey are surveyed every two years only. We have examined the latter case by 
constructing databases with a two years lag instead of a one-year lag and it very slightly 
affects the number of firms in the sample. This is because this different convention 
imposes three years of presence in the dataset for the majority of firms instead of two, so 
that the gains are compensated by the losses. Therefore we kept the convention to keep 
firms with two consecutive years of presence in the dataset. 
The cleaning threshold for the growth rates is 0.1, that is 10% between two consecutive 
growth rates. The losses linked to the merger are between 30% to 40%. The losses from 
the cleaning of the growth rates, that intervenes after the cleaning on logarithm of the 
ratios and a merger, allows keeping almost all the firms in the sample. The latter result 
clearly comes from the first cleaning. 
Notice that during the merger no loss is linked to the identification of the firms, since in 
France all firms have a national identification number (the SIREN code) and its use is 








a  After cleaning  % remaining 
1985 1730 1340 77.5 
1986 1867 1442 77.2 
1987 2034 1577 77.5 
1988 2404 1785 74.3 
1989 2698 1905 70.6 
1990 2769 1913 69.1 
1991 2805 1990 70.9 
1992 2677 2060 77.0 
1993 3262 2526 77.4 
1994 3468 2610 75.3 
1995 3347 2565 76.6 
1996 3362 2654 78.9 
1997 3091 2409 77.9 
a. Merger of the R&D survey with the BRN accounting data.  29
 
 
Table A.2 : Merger and cleaning on the growth rates 
(two-year datasets) 
 
This cleaning is made from the one-year datasets. 
Year Merger  with 
the previous 
year 
% remaining  Cleaning  % remaining  % after 
mergers and 
cleaning 
1986 1114 77.3 1032 92.6 55.3 
1987 1197 75.9 1126 94.1 55.4 
1988 1299 72.8 1236 95.2 51.4 
1989 1304 68.5 1230 94.3 45.6 
1990 1399 73.1 1316 94.1 47.5 
1991 1484 74.6 1407 94.8 50.2 
1992 1459 70.8 1396 95.7 52.1 
1993 1522 60.3 1445 94.9 44.3 
1994 1692 64.8 1633 96.5 47.1 
1995 1753 68.3 1665 95.0 49.7 
1996 1752 66.0 1672 95.4 49.7 
1997 1676 69.6 1618 96.5 52.3 
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Appendix 2: Effect of subsidies on the R&D to sales ratio 
 
 
Table A.3 : Estimates on the R&D to sales ratio 
 
Nadaraya-Watson estimates of the causal effect. The estimation uses a gaussian kernel with a 
Silverman window. The standard errors are computed by the bootstrap with a number of repetitions 
following Andrews and Buchinsky (see appendix 3). 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level. 
Output 
variables 
Dummy = 1 for firms that have increased 
their R&D to sales ratio (0 otherwise) 
Growth rate of the R&D to sales ratio 
Estimates  Effect on the 
treated 
(c1) 






Effect on the 
treated 
(c1) 























































































































































Appendix 3: Number of bootstrap repetitions 
We determine the number of bootstrap repetitions by the method of Andrews and 
Buchinsky (2000, 2001) with, in the authors’ notation, () ( ) 05 0 10 . , , pdb = t . Since we have 
12 quantities to evaluate on each year, we take the maximum number of simulations of 
each year, denoted B*. The following table gives the detail. 
Table A.4: Selecting the number of bootstrap repetitions 
 
Year  Effect  Dummy=1 if 
private R&D 
increased 
Growth rate of 
private R&D 
Dummy=1 if 
private R&D / 
sales increased 
Growth rate of the 
private R&D to 
sales ratio 
1986 C  145  99  136 113 
B* = 170  C0  170  95  143  124 
  C1  122 91 106 92 
1987 C  149 109 137 125 
B*  =  156  C0  137 120 131 134 
  C1  156 106 112 132 
1988 C  152 132 140 163 
B*  =  163  C0  145 135 148 162 
  C1  90  131 117 163 
1989 C  272 264 198 248 
B*  =  276  C0  276 274 204 233 
  C1  122 155 122 168 
1990 C  150 140  92  123 
B*  =  180  C0  157 139 108 117 
 C1  165  141  98  180 
1991 C  127 116  95  98 
B* = 143  C0  143  115  94  104 
  C1  113 106 110 104 
1992 C  153 197 163 139 
B*  =  197  C0  166 181 169 143 
  C1  123 168 102 123 
1993 C  109 157 159 145 
B*  =  220  C0  121 152 144 123 
  C1  96  130 212 220 
1994 C  202 196 163 153 
B*  =  232  C0  232 193 173 142 
  C1  118 143 136 153 
1995 C  122 127 168 164 
B*  =  191  C0  124 119 179 152 
 C1  143  191  96  173 
1996 C  125 127 195 139 
B*  =  195  C0  133 137 195 146 
 C1  110  121  97  92 
1997 C  152 148 108 112 
B*  =  162  C0  162 149 103 115 
  C1  105 155 147 127  32
Figure 1 : Total R&D expenditures of the sample 















Figure 2 : Average R&D expenditures of the sample 
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Figure 3: Average R&D subsidy of the sample 
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Figure 4 : Average R&D subsidy by recipient 
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Variable Number  of 
firms 









Unit  ´  Billions  Millions  Millions  % % % 
1985 1032 158 6985  1680 34.4  4.4  24.0 
1986 1032 159 7567  1756 32.7  4.7  23.2 
1987 1126 168 8610  1975 28.0  5.1  22.9 
1988 1236 174 9483  2115 29.5  5.4  22.3 
1989 1230 190 9923  1820 31.2  5.2  18.3 
1990 1316  214  11727  2157  31.1 5.5 18.4 
1991 1407  254  14623  2907  34.5 5.8 19.9 
1992 1396  267  14404  2641  34.3 5.4 18.3 
1993 1445  258  14663  2415  33.5 5.7 16.5 
1994 1633  281  15477  2393  32.1 5.5 15.5 
1995 1665  292  14659  1666  27.9 5.0 11.4 
1996 1672 293  14361  1388  27.8 4.9  9.7 




Table 2: Entry and Exit from subsidies 
 
Each line sums up to 100% 
Entry: without subsidy on the previous year and with a subsidy on the current year. 
Exit: with a subsidy on the previous year and without a subsidy on the current year. 
Firms  Without subsidies for 
two consecutive 
years 
Entry  Exit  With subsidies for two 
consecutive years 
1986 59.6  5.6  7.2  27.6 
1987 62.5  5.5  8.7  23.3 
1988 63.4  7.7  7.0  21.9 
1989 61.8  8.0  6.4  23.7 
1990 61.3  7.2  8.0  23.5 
1991 59.1  8.7  6.2  26.0 
1992 56.6  7.0  9.0  27.4 
1993 56.8  7.5  9.4  26.3 
1994 58.6  7.1  8.1  26.2 
1995 62.3  5.0  8.0  24.7 
1996 63.5  6.2  7.3  23.0 
1997 65.2  5.3  7.2  22.3  35
Table 3 : Averages Comparison 
 
 
The t statistics are computed by the bootstrap on 100 repetitions. 
Variables  Percentage of firms that have maintained or 
increased their private R&D 
Average growth rate of private R&D 
expenditures 
Firms Unsubsidized  Subsidized Student  Unsubsidized  Subsidized Student 
1986 72.4  66.8  1.70 7.5  7.6 0.05 
1987  74.4 62.9 3.77 10.6  5.2  2.67 
1988 74.9  67.9  2.38 9.7  7.3 1.26 
1989  74.2 66.4 2.96 10.1  8.3  1.11 
1990 71.2  68.2  1.00 7.8  7.9 0.04 
1991 71.0  66.4  1.65 7.0  9.1 1.05 
1992 61.8  54.3  2.81 -0.1 -2.5 0.48 
1993 56.9  50.6  2.25 2.6 -0.2 1.17 
1994 58.4  54.7  1.24 1.7  2.1 0.20 
1995 61.8  60.8  0.44 5.5  6.3 0.44 
1996 60.0  56.0  1.29 2.2 -0.7 1.78 
1997 64.0  61.0  0.33 2.8  3.7 0.50 
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Table 4 : Determinants of subsidy grants 1986-1992 
 
 
Dependent variable : Subsidy dummy on the current year (0/1) 
Maximum likelihood estimation of the logit model (asymptotic standard errors between parentheses). The industry 
classification is the NAP 1973. It changed between 1992 and 1993. The significant industry dummies only have 













































Average of the logarithms 

























































T11 : Chemicals  ´  -1.23 
(0.42) 
´  ´  ´  ´  ´ 














T13 : Metalworking  ´  -0.74 
(0.44) 
´  ´  ´  0.60 
(0.32) 
´ 
T14 : non-electrical 
machinery 
´  -0.50 
(0.26) 
´  -0.49 
(0.22) 
´  ´  ´ 
T15A : electrical 
machinery 
´  ´  ´  ´  ´  -0.32 
(0.18) 
´ 
T16 : car industry  ´  -1.20 
(0.59) 
´  ´  ´  ´  ´ 
T23 : rubber  -1.10 
(0.58) 
´  ´  ´  ´  ´  ´ 
T33 : services to firms  ´  -0.71 
(0.37) 
´  ´  ´  ´  ´ 
% Concordant predictions  89.9%  88.3%  85.1%  86.5%  81.8%  83.6%  83.0% 
Common support bounds 
in % 
4.4-87.6 2.9-78.8 3.0-76.5 4.5-79.6 5.2-74.3 4.9-77.0 4.3-77.9 
Firms remaining for the 
matching % 




Table 5 : Determinants of subsidy grants 1993-1997 
 
Dependent variable : Subsidy dummy on the current year (0/1) 
Maximum likelihood estimation of the logit model (asymptotic standard errors between parentheses). The 
industry classification is the NAF 1993. It allows for international comparisons. The significant industry 
dummies only have been included in the regression. 
Lagged explanative variables  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Intercept  -2.74 (0.57)  -2.50 (0.52)  -3.60 (0.56)  -3.22 (0.56)  -2.66 (0.57) 
Past subsidy dummy (0/1)  2.73 (0.23)  2.31 (0.22)  3.16 (0.24)  2.91 (0.24)  2.94 (0.25) 
Average of the logarithms of 
past subsidy rates 
0.15 (0.05)  0.02 (0.05)  0.15 (0.05)  0.16 (0.05)  0.17 (0.05) 
Log Private R&D / Sales  0.43 (0.06)  0.44 (0.06)  0.35 (0.06)  0.37 (0.06)  0.25 (0.06) 
Log Debt / Sales  0.49 (0.14)  0.37 (0.12)  0.44 (0.12)  0.62 (0.12)  0.57 (0.12) 
Log Sales  0.19 (0.05)  0.16 (0.05)  0.19 (0.05)  0.18 (0.05)  0.11 (0.05) 
B0 : food industry  ´  ´  ´  0.80 (0.31)  ´ 
C3 : pharmaceuticals  ´  -0.73 (0.26)  ´  ´  ´ 
E2 : non-electrical machinery  -0.40 (0.19)  ´  -0.48 (0.19)  -0.37 (0.20)  -0.56 (0.20) 
F4 : chemicals  ´  ´  ´  ´  -0.34 (0.21) 
F6 : electronic components  ´  ´  ´  0.44 (0.27)  ´ 
Concordant predictions %  81.7%  81.3%  82.1%  81.5%  79.9% 
Common support bounds in 
% 
4.7-76.9 4.0-75.4 2.6-67.4 3.2-69.5 2.8-66.4 
Firms remaining for the 
matching % 
87.5 91.5 89.4 88.9 92.9 
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Table 6 : Matching evaluation of the effect of R&D Subsidies 
 
Nadaraya-Watson estimates of the causal effect. The estimation uses a gaussian kernel with a Silverman 
window. The standard errors are computed by the bootstrap with a number of repetitions following 
Andrews and Buchinsky (see appendix 3). 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level. 
Output 
variables 
Dummy = 1 for firms that have increased 
their R&D to sales ratio (0 otherwise) 
Growth rate of the R&D to sales ratio 
Estimates  Effect on the 
treated 
(c1) 






Effect on the 
treated 
(c1) 
Effect on the 
non-treated 
(c0) 
Global effect 
 
(c) 
1986 -0.052 
(0.065) 
-0.192** 
(0.058) 
-0.153** 
(0.050) 
-0.036 
(0.053) 
-0.052 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.036) 
1987 -0.091* 
(0.052) 
-0.042 
(0.065) 
-0.054 
(0.056) 
-0.101** 
(0.038) 
-0.059 
(0.047) 
-0.069* 
(0.040) 
1988 -0.048 
(0.038) 
-0.121** 
(0.051) 
-0.102** 
(0.044) 
-0.021 
(0.025) 
-0.032 
(0.031) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
1989 -0.063 
(0.041) 
-0.151** 
(0.060) 
-0.123** 
(0.049) 
-0.019 
(0.035) 
-0.062 
(0.049) 
-0.048 
(0.040) 
1990 -0.004 
(0.038) 
-0.026 
(0.047) 
-0.019 
(0.040) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.038) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
1991 0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.064 
(0.048) 
-0.040 
(0.040) 
0.041 
(0.027) 
0.035 
(0.043) 
0.037 
(0.035) 
1992 -0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.122** 
(0.049) 
-0.098** 
(0.040) 
-0.031 
(0.028) 
-0.031 
(0.051) 
-0.031 
(0.039) 
1993 -0.045 
(0.036) 
-0.065 
(0.045) 
-0.058 
(0.037) 
-0.001 
(0.030) 
-0.032 
(0.041) 
-0.021 
(0.033) 
1994 -0.010 
(0.034) 
-0.006 
(0.047) 
-0.007 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.023) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.033 
(0.028) 
1995 0.003 
(0.033) 
-0.009 
(0.055) 
-0.006 
(0.045) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.042) 
-0.001 
(0.034) 
1996 -0.029 
(0.034) 
-0.060 
(0.046) 
-0.051 
(0.039) 
-0.030 
(0.023) 
-0.076* 
(0.039) 
-0.063** 
(0.032) 
1997 0.005 
(0.030) 
-0.083 
(0.052) 
-0.060 
(0.043) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
-0.020 
(0.038) 
-0.008 
(0.031) 
 